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Abstract 
When pressed for evidence that the proposed health reform legislation will control costs, 
proponents invariably cite the numerous pilot programs and other innovations in Medicare 
payment policy contained in the bill.  At first blush, the ACO model seems well designed to foster 
competition among providers.  Not unlike health maintenance organizations and other integrated 
delivery forms, ACOs assume responsibility for coordinating care and thus have strong 
incentives to provide cost effective care and to do so in a manner that is transparent and 
hospitable to comparative shoppers. But at the same time, the path of ACO development could 
prove profoundly anti-competitive.  The concern lies with the possible exacerbation of already-
weak competitive conditions prevailing in provider markets.  This essay, written at as the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act was enacted, discusses competition policy issues associated 
with the Shared Savings Program. 
When pressed for evidence that the proposed health reform legislation will control costs, 
proponents invariably cite the numerous pilot programs and other innovations in Medicare 
payment policy contained in the bill.  Among the most promising of these is the “Shared Savings 
Program” found in Section 3022 of H.R. 3590,1 which will test the effectiveness of Accountable 
Care Organizations (ACOs) in rationalizing the delivery system and controlling costs.  The idea, 
which carries the endorsement of  the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC)2 and 
the influential health service researchers at Dartmouth,3
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 is not entirely novel.  In many respects 
the ACO is the latest in a long line of efforts to develop integrated delivery systems that bear 
financial responsibility for treatment decisions.  In addition, a number of experiments involving 
1 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. § 3022 (2009) (enacted at Pub. L. No. 111-
148, 124 Stat. 119, to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1899). 
2 MEDPAC, IMPROVING INCENTIVES IN THE MEDICARE PROGRAM 40–58 (2009), available at
http://www.medpac.gov/documents/Jun09_EntireReport.pdf.  
3 Elliott S. Fisher et al., Fostering Accountable Health Care: Moving Forward In Medicare, 28 HEALTH AFF. w.219 
(2009), available at http://tdi.dartmouth.edu/documents/publications/HA%20Fisher-McClellan%20art.pdf. 
bundled payments to ACOs and to other innovative organizations (as in Medicare’s Physician 
Group Practice demonstration) have been underway for some time.  
Supporters contend that as a voluntary pilot program, ACOs can develop in forms 
suitable to local market conditions and gain acceptance in the physician communities that have 
proved resistant to managed care structures in the past.  In the long run, the aspiration is that 
private insurers will follow suit and proliferating ACOs will lead the way to delivery system 
reform. 
The ACO concept envisions a legal entity comprised of and controlled by providers that 
would assume financial responsibility for the cost and care of a defined population of Medicare 
beneficiaries while being subject to a variety of quality standards and information reporting 
requirements.4  The new law leaves much detail to the discretion of the Secretary of the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS),5 presumably informed by experience and 
learning as the program progresses.  For example, the legislation delegates development of 
standards for quality, use of evidence-based medicine, and “patient-centeredness” to HHS.6  In 
addition, ACOs may take diverse forms, such as local networks of physicians, hospitals, and 
their affiliated physicians, fully integrated health systems, or “virtual” networks of providers.7
4 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. § 3022 (2009) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
1899(a)(1)). 
Notably,  the new law allows the Secretary of HHS to implement several alternative incentive 
payment methodologies  including a “shared savings” performance bonus arrangements based on 
the ACOs net savings from traditional Medicare payment ; “partial captitation” of some or all of 
Part A and B costs;  and such other methodologies that the Secretary determines will improve 
5 Id. (to be codified at § 1899(b)(3)). 
6 Id.
7 Id. (to be codified at § 1899(b)(1)). 
quality and efficiency). Each option poses raises significant questions. For example it is not clear 
that a shared savings bonus model will effectively counteract the volume-increasing incentives 
under fee-for-service payment; nor is it clear that partial capitation payment can be implemented 
without raising issues of under-provision of care and other problems associated with managed 
care in the past.8
A critical problem, largely ignored during the legislative debate, is the likely tension 
between the legislation’s overall reliance on competition and the organizational structures and 
norms that may be established by ACOs.  At first blush, the ACO model seems well designed to 
foster competition among providers.  Not unlike health maintenance organizations and other 
integrated delivery forms, ACOs assume responsibility for coordinating care and thus have 
strong incentives to provide cost effective care and to do so in a manner that is transparent and 
hospitable to comparative shoppers. 
But at the same time, the path of ACO development could prove profoundly anti-
competitive.  The concern lies with the possible exacerbation of already-weak competitive 
conditions prevailing in provider markets.  Owing to indifferent enforcement of antitrust laws by 
the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice over the last ten years and 
questionable judicial precedents, hospital mergers proceeded at an unprecedented pace.9
8 See KELLY DEVERS & ROBERT BERENSON, CAN ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS IMPROVE THE VALUE OF 
HEALTH CARE BY SOLVING THE COST AND QUALITY QUANDARIES? (2009). 
  Over 
ninety-three percent of the nation’s population lived in concentrated hospital markets, and the 
American consumer bore the brunt of the predictable outcome: hospital consolidation in the 
1990s raised overall inpatient prices by at least five percent and by forty percent or more when 
9 See Thomas L. Greaney, Competition Policy and Organizational Fragmentation in Health Care, 71 U. PITT L.
REV.217 (2009). 
merging hospitals were closely located.10  Less well noted is the concentration in specialty 
physician markets that went unchallenged during recent years, lessening the ability of managed 
care organizations to negotiate lower prices for their services.11  Further, even where antitrust 
prosecutors were active, challenging over seventy-five physician cartels involved in price fixing 
or efforts to thwart managed care, the relief gained was little more than a wrist slap, an 
unfortunate dereliction that certainly did little to foster competitive norms in the provider 
community.12
Encouraging competitive development of ACOs in this market environment may prove 
challenging.  First, it is unclear the extent to which regulators will foster the formation of 
multiple, competitive ACOs around the country.  It is certainly feasible that HHS might 
determine (as the reform legislation appears to allow) that it is more important to encourage 
voluntary participation in ACOs than to promote competitive ACOs.  An “open door” policy for 
ACOs (allowing them to include all comers in their markets) would likely lead to concentrated 
formal and informal affiliations.  (As noted above, the FTC has dealt with dozens of proposed 
physician networks and “super PHOs” of considerable size that proposed to bargain on behalf of 
physicians and hospitals; efforts to create overinclusive ACOs to lessen rivalry are unlikely to 
  Overall, it is fair to characterize the prevailing attitude among providers over the 
past thirty years as one of seeking first to avoid competition though concentrative mergers and 
other affiliations and, in some cases, by engaging in illegal collusion. 
10 CLAUDIA H WILLIAMS ET AL., HOW HAS HOSPITAL CONSOLIDATION AFFECTED THE PRICE AND QUALITY OF 
HOSPITAL CARE 2 (2006), available at http://www.rwjf.org/files/research/no9policybrief.pdf. 
11 See Competition in the Health Care Marketplace: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Consumer Protection, 
Product Safety & Insurance, Comm. on Commerce, Science & Transportation, 111th Cong. (July 16, 2009) 
(testimony of Thomas L. Greaney), available at http://law.slu.edu/healthlaw/news_stories/statement.pdf. 
12 Thomas L. Greaney, Thirty Years of Solicitude: Antitrust Law and Physician Cartels, 7 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. &
POL’Y 189, 196–97 (2007). 
diminish).  It also bears remembering that provider groups have lobbied incessantly for many 
years for exemptions from antitrust laws, arguing at various times that a “level playing field” 
justified collective bargaining by physicians, or that efficiency would be improved by such 
immunity.13
Even if the Secretary adopts a policy of encouraging competition among ACOs, there 
may be competitive obstacles to effectively implementing that goal.  First, as discussed above, 
the highly concentrated state of many provider markets may make it difficult for HHS to secure 
participants willing to “share” their savings proportionately with other providers.  Moreover, if 
the Medicare ACOs are seen as likely to be adopted by private insurers, dominant providers will 
not be reticent to exercise their market clout.  As Robert Leibenluft, a former FTC official has 
pointed out, in allocating among themselves the shared savings of their ACO, physicians and 
hospitals may adversely affect competition in the private market:  
The meetings at which the reallocation of those funds occurs may . . . be the types 
of meetings in which price collusion can take place.  Deciding how ACO 
revenues should be divided among the ACO participants typically would not raise 
antitrust concerns, but serious issues would arise if such discussions spill over 
into how independent providers will contract outside the ACO context.  
The new arrangements also may make it easier for physicians to exclude 
potential competitors from entry into the local market.14
As I have argued elsewhere,15
13 See Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Thoughts on “Leveling the Playing Field” in Health Care 
Markets, Remarks at the Nat’l Health Lawyers Ass’n Twentieth Annual Program on Antitrust in the Health Care 
Field (Feb. 13, 1997); see also William S. Brubaker III, Will Physician Unions Improve Health System 
Performance?, 27 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 575, 577–85 (2002). 
 the structure of our health care delivery system gives us 
the worst of both worlds: fragmentation and concentration.  Hospital and specialty provider 
markets are highly concentrated; most primary care physicians remain in “silos” of solo or small 
14 Robert F. Leibenluft, Health Reform and Market Competition: Opportunities and Challenges, 98 Antitrust Trade 
& Reg. Rep. (BNA) (Mar. 12, 2010). 
15 See Greaney, supra note 9. 
practice groups; and there is scant “vertical integration” among providers of different services.  
Not only does this phenomenon impede effective bargaining to reduce costs and prevent 
overutilization of services, but it also has adverse effects on the quality of health services patients 
receive because it inhibits coordination of care.  While ACOs represent the most promising 
antidote on the horizon to this problem, their success will depend on vigilant monitoring of 
competitive conditions by HHS and the antitrust enforcement authorities.    
